Wednesday 25 December 2019

Myanmar Govt to Develop Offshore Gas With Total, Woodside and Local Company

Source Irrawady news, 19 Dec
  • 10.1k

YANGON—The state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise signed agreements for gas production Monday with a joint venture that includes domestic company MPRL E&P Co., Woodside Energy from Australia and French energy giant Total.

The agreements cover production at offshore gas block A-6, which is located some 80 km west of Pathein Township in Ayeyarwady Region and has good prospects for commercial production, according to MPRL E&P Co.

Four exploration wells have been dug in the area and showed large gas deposits for commercial production, said MPRL E&P Co. executive director U Tint Swe.

"In the next stage, we will start production. We will dig production wells and produce natural gas," he said.

The joint venture plans to start commercial production on Dec. 31, 2023.

"The gas production at offshore blocks which the country currently relies on may decrease in 2023-24. The fact that we can develop the A-6 [block] for commercial production increases the potential of the country's energy sector," said U Tint Swe.

The A-6 block is the first commercially viable ultra-deepwater drilling project in Southeast Asia, according to a press release by MPRL E&P Co.

The productivity and quality of this ultra-deep water drilling may be better than other offshore blocks, but cost of production may be four or five times higher and there are technological challenges.

Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise director Daw Khin Khin Aye told The Irrawaddy that the gas produced from the A-6 block will be used mainly to supply gas-fired power plants in Myanmar.

She added that it is still too early to say if the A-6 block can make up for an expected decline in production at other gas fields such as Zawtika, Shwe and Yadana.

The Myanmar government and MPRL E&P signed a production-sharing agreement in 2007. MPRL E&P holds a 20 percent stake in block A6, while Woodside Energy and Total hold 40 percent each. Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise can reportedly take 15-20 percent of the gas once production begins.

Total has operated in Myanmar since 1993 and currently operates the Yadana offshore gas field.

"The government has long talked about the A-6 block as a potential site. If it is commercially viable to produce gas, it will be good for the country's electricity sector," electricity expert U Aye Kyaw Kyaw, the secretary of Yangon Region's Electricity Development Management Committee, told The Irrawaddy.

A retired official of Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise who requested anonymity said that A-6, unlike other oil and gas fields, is controlled by the government and will be used mainly to meet the electricity demand of the country.

The Ministry of Electricity and Energy has announced that it will invite tenders for exploration at 31 oil and gas blocks in early 2020. Myanmar has 51 offshore oil and gas blocks and 53 onshore blocks. Myanmar's military governments and U Thein Sein's administration issued tenders for 38 offshore blocks and 35 onshore blocks.

Total has operated in Myanmar since 1993 and currently operates the Yadana offshore gas field. The company has faced numerous allegations of complicity with abuses by Myanmar's military government and human rights abuses, including forced labor, related to the development of the Yadana pipeline.

Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko

Sunday 15 December 2019

ARNA Calls for Assurance of Justice for Rohingya

Source ARNA

Our Ref: ARNA/2019/075                                                                                                                    

Date: 15 Dec 2019


ARNA Calls for Assurance of Justice for Rohingya


The Arakan Rohingya National Assembly (ARNA) welcomes the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Court (ICC) and Argentinean Courts, stepping forward for Rohingya people who are victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and various forms of ongoing persecution and oppression.


The rejection of Rohingya is being promoted as a joint cause by the Myanmar government, working closely with extremist monks, nationalists and the Buddhist majority public.   International prosecution of criminal government authorities from top to bottom is therefore essential.  It is also critical for addressing the root causes of ongoing persecutions in Myanmar not only for Rohingya, but also for other minorities and helps achieve justice for the past, present and future.


The military powered NLD government led by Ms. Suu Kyi has defiantly blocked the UN inquiry commission, diplomats, independent journalists, aid agencies and material supplies essential for basic survival of the Rohingya people. Now the state councilor Suu Kyi's defense of undeniable heinous crimes through her false political narrative, is just over-acting in order to protect the criminal military generals who are responsible for heinous crimes from past and present.


Furthermore, the Suu Kyi government has built a smoke screen by signing MoU with UNHCR & UNDP and Repatriation Agreements with Bangladesh while collecting huge amount of foreign funds in the name of "stabilization" in Arakan (Rakhine) state.  This has achieved no practical outcomes on the ground.  Rather, it has helped maintain an insecure environment for the existing Rohingya and Kaman population. This smokescreen has also assisted the government to fabricate information and spread misleading propaganda to deflect international pressures and deter international prosecutions.


Today over a million Rohingya refugees have become a heavy burden for Bangladesh alone, with surrounding issues of human trafficking, sex trafficking and organs trafficking.  Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are being subjected to restrictions on movement, restrictions on communication services such as mobile phones and a planned mass relocation to 'BaShanShar' - a remote and uninhabited island, on top of their existing vulnerability.  The Myanmar government's failure to accede to the Bangladesh government's 4-point Action Plan for repatriation, including accountability and engagement with international communities on the ground where Rohingya will be settled, has led to the 'BaShanShar' relocation program, funded by China. Rohingya refugees fear that mass relocation to 'BashanShar' would result in the creation of a complete sphere of isolation, possibly enabling the repatriation into the existing ghetto conditions in Arakan state. 


The country Myanmar has yet to prove the progress as agreements signed with Bangladesh by settling of about 4,000 Rohingyas from Zero-zone and about 150,000 of Rohingyas and Kamans from over 42 internal displaced camps who have been systematically confined in ghetto types since June 2012 and allowing them to recourse to become citizens, and ceasing of arbitrary arrests and imprisonment of Rohingya and Kamans for travelling.


In Myanmar, the central government policy creates a massive gap by pitting majority Buddhism against minority non-Buddhist communities particularly Rohingya.  This policy as well as policies that involve the continuous denial of actual facts and reluctance to cooperate on matters that require government accountability, transparency and fairness, are now part of the norm.  The crisis in Arakan is a part of life, including the deaths among a million Rohingya refugees taking shelter in Bangladesh, the remaining Rohingyas and Kamans numbering between 350,000 and 500,000 including those 150,000 trapped systematically in ghetto type camps across Arakan (Rakhine) state and are still facing frequent attacks and deadly starvation from June 2012.


The ending of ongoing genocide and heinous atrocities against Rohingya in Burma and the settlement of millions of vulnerable Rohingya refugees with dignity and safety, will never happen unless mandated concrete actions are taken through international prosecutions, a global political commitment to the R2P resolution and humanitarian intervention with the creation of a protected safe zone.  In fact, they are only viable options since 'security, safety, existence and welfare' have fallen, creating heavy risk - national authorities are manifestly reluctant to protect, while the state has been sponsoring genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.


For these reasons, we call the member countries of the United Nations, international communities, global leaders, humanitarian actors and human rights groups to support the ICJ ruling and the 'Provisional Measures' of ICJ as a first step.



 M. ILYAS (chairman), h/p: +(44) 7780 359718, UK

Contact in other countries

Habib, h/p: +(61) 413 799 418, Australia

HF. Hashim Mahmood, h/p: +(88) 1729 872581, Bangladesh

Ayub Khan, h/p: +(60) 11 33315246, Malaysia


Saturday 14 December 2019

‘The Lady’ is a liar: Suu Kyi’s genocide whitewash

Source AsiaTimes, 13 Dec

Rohingya civilians." That's the phrase conspicuously absent from Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi's 3,500-word statement to the International Court of Justice on Wednesday. The omission is no accident.

Suu Kyi's highly anticipated ICJ appearance was to answer to The Gambia's official complaint of Myanmar's violations of the United Nations' 1948 Genocide Convention, linked to the extreme military abuses against Muslim Rohingya civilians. Yet her judicial defense strategy studiously avoided any mention of civilian suffering.

Instead, Suu Kyi – the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate – peddled the Myanmar military's long-discredited narrative that its activities in northern Rakhine state in August 2017 constituted legitimate "clearance operations" in response to attacks on police posts, allegedly perpetrated by an insurgent group. According to Suu Kyi, what transpired was merely "an internal armed conflict started by coordinated and comprehensive attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, to which Myanmar's Defense Services responded."

Unfortunately for Suu Kyi, that narrative is at odds with voluminous evidence compiled by the United Nations' Independent International Fact Finding Mission on MyanmarPhysicians for Human Rights (PHR), and other rights monitors. That documentation demonstrates a vicious, widespread, and systematic targeting of Rohingya civilians by security forces in a weeks-long violence spree that began on August 25, 2017. That's when security forces attacked hundreds of Rohingya villages, massacring thousands of their residents, gang-raping thousands more, and burning their homes to the ground.

As of January this year, the violence and ongoing abuses had killed at least 10,000 Rohingya civilians and prompted about 740,000 others to flee for their lives to Cox's Bazar in neighboring Bangladesh, where they remain. Some 600,000 Rohingya civilians still in Rakhine state remain at risk of further genocidal acts, according to the UN's Fact-Finding Mission.

Suu Kyi's claims of judicious and lawful use of force by the Myanmar military flies in the face of compelling evidence of egregious brutality inflicted on Rohingya civilians. The results of a quantitative survey conducted by PHR of 605 surviving Rohingya community leaders in Bangladesh published in March paints a grim picture of the terror inflicted by Myanmar security forces. Most respondents identified the military and the official Border Guard Police as the security forces who deployed "military assets, including helicopters, military trucks, and tanks" against defenseless Rohingya men, women and children in August 2017.

But Suu Kyi made clear that she was not in The Hague to focus on facts.

Instead, she contended that the Myanmar military had strenuously sought to "minimize the risk of collateral damage" in their operations. Even worse, she sought to malign the integrity of The Gambia by asserting that its ICJ genocide complaint constituted "an incomplete and misleading factual picture of the situation in Rakhine state." Suu Kyi salted this slight by suggesting that foreign states were incapable of informed and balanced assessments of these atrocities because "the situation in Rakhine is complex and not easy to fathom."

What Suu Kyi failed to mention is that her government has consistently blocked outside scrutiny of the 2017 bloodshed by prohibiting international organizations seeking to investigate the slaughter from accessing the area

What Suu Kyi failed to mention is that her government has consistently blocked outside scrutiny of the 2017 bloodshed by prohibiting international organizations seeking to investigate the slaughter from accessing the area. The government has also blocked the United Nations Special Rapporteur to Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, tasked with assessing the human-rights situation in the country, from undertaking a credible investigation into the violence. In 2017, the government placed restrictions on an official fact-finding mission led by Lee that she described as an "affront to the independence of my mandate." That December, the government announced it was denying her access to the country.

Instead, Suu Kyi sought to assure the judges in The Hague that her government and the Myanmar military are best placed to ensure accountability for the violence of late 2017 in northern Rakhine. Specifically, she touted the capacity of Myanmar's very own so-called Independent Commission of Inquiry to ensure justice is done. She neglected to mention that the ICOI discredited itself as a state whitewash operation when it reported in December that it "had found no evidence so far to prove the widespread allegations that government security forces committed mass human-rights abuses."

Suu Kyi's patent falsehoods and doublespeak would be laughable if the stakes were not so high. Without meaningful accountability for the crimes of 2017, there is no possibility of a safe, voluntary, and dignified return of the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees who have taken refuge in Bangladesh.

Those Rohingya won't return to Myanmar while their military victimizers roam free with the explicit approval of a government that refuses to utter the word "Rohingya" and continues to justify their mass extermination as a reasonable response to "terrorist activities."

Suu Kyi's shameful performance in The Hague makes clear that she and "her father's army" are resolutely unwilling to impose accountability on themselves. That failure only reinforces The Gambia's case at the ICJ that Myanmar's crimes against the Rohingya require a substantive international judicial response to ensure accountability for past atrocities and to help deter future abuses.

Phelim Kine

Phelim Kine is the director of research and investigations at Physicians for Human Rights and a former deputy director in Human Rights Watch's Asia Division. He is also an adjunct professor in the Roosevelt House Public Policy Institute at Hunter College in New York. A former news wire bureau chief in Jakarta, Kine worked as a journalist for more than a decade in China, Indonesia, Cambodia and Taiwan prior to becoming an human rights researcher and activist in 2007.

Canadian lawyer defends himself for researching crimes against Rohingya in Myanmar, then representing the country at International Court of Justice

Source TheGlobeandMail, 13 Dec

"William Schabas is basically selling out the Rohingya for some Myanmar gov't $$$. Really the worst sort of behaviour, how totally immoral and two-faced," Phil Robertson, Deputy Asia Director at Human Rights Watch said.. 

William Schabas, a Canadian lawyer defending Myanmar against genocide charges at the U.N.'s International Court of Justice (ICJ), poses for a photo before an interview with Reuters in The Hague, Netherlands December 12, 2019.


Canadian lawyer William Schabas, an international scholar on genocide, has been criticised by friend and foe for first researching crimes against the Muslim Rohingya of Myanmar, and now defending the state accused of perpetrating them. 

ICJ Hearings Gambia v.s Myanmar

Please click the links:

Day-1: by Gambia- 

Day-2: by Myanmar-

Day-3: responses by Gambia

Sunday 8 December 2019

Questions and Answers on Gambia’s Genocide Case Against Myanmar before the ICJ

Source HRW, 5 Dec

Abdul Kareem, a Rohingya Muslim, carries his mother, Alima Khatoon, to a refugee camp after crossing from Burma into Bangladesh on Sept. 16, 2017.

© 2017 Dar Yasin/AP

Why has Gambia filed a case against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice?

Why is this case important?

Will Myanmar respond to Gambia's ICJ case?

How could the ICJ enforce a provisional measures order?

What has Gambia alleged in its complaint against Myanmar?

What relief can the ICJ provide to victims if it rules in favor of Gambia?

Who are the ICJ's judges?

Has the ICJ ruled on other genocide cases?

Are there efforts to bring individual perpetrators in Myanmar to justice?

What are the prospects for justice in Myanmar?

1.Why has Gambia filed a case against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice?

Myanmar's military, known as the Tatmadaw, has committed extensive atrocities against ethnic Rohingya Muslims, including murder, rape, and arson. These abuses reached their peak during the Tatmadaw's brutal ethnic cleansing campaign, beginning in August 2017, that forced more than 740,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. These crimes have been thoroughly documented by the United Nations, the media, and human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch.

Gambia – with the backing of the 57 members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – has filed a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging that Myanmar's atrocities against the Rohingya in Rakhine State violate various provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("the Genocide Convention"). Gambia, which ratified the convention in 1978, brought the case under article 9 of the convention, which allows for disputes between parties "relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide" and related acts to be submitted to the ICJ by any party. The ICJ previously confirmed that all member states of the convention have a duty to prevent and to punish genocide. Myanmar has been a party to the Genocide Convention since 1956.

The case before the ICJ is not a criminal case against individual alleged perpetrators and it does not involve the International Criminal Court (ICC), a separate body (see below). Rather, the case is "state-to-state" litigation between UN member states governed by legal provisions in the UN Charter, the ICJ Statute, and the Genocide Convention.

Gambia's filing marks the first time that a country without any direct connection to the alleged crimes has used its membership in the Genocide Convention to bring a case before the ICJ. Gambia has only recently emerged from the repressive 22-year rule of Yahyah Jammeh and its own difficult history of human rights violations. After filing the case, Gambian Justice Minister Abubacarr Tambadou said that "the aim is to get Myanmar to account for its action against its own people: the Rohingya."

2.Why is this case important?

The Tatmadaw's well-documented crimes against the Rohingya and other ethnic minority groups in Myanmar span decades, but until Gambia brought a case before the ICJ, the government's atrocities had largely been beyond the reach of justice.

While the case may take many years to reach a final ruling, Gambia has asked the court for an order for provisional measures "to protect the rights of the Rohingya group and those of The Gambia under the Genocide Convention, and to prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute pending the final judgment of the Court." The hearing on provisional measures will take place on December 10-12, 2019 in The Hague, Netherlands.

Among the provisional measures that Gambia has requested the court to order "as a matter of extreme urgency" are that Myanmar should immediately take all measures to prevent all genocidal acts; Myanmar should ensure that the military does not commit any genocidal acts; and Myanmar should not destroy or render inaccessible any events related to the underlying application.

The timeline for a decision on the provisional measures can be relatively quick. Bosnia and Herzegovina asked for provisional measures when filing its Genocide Convention case against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 20, 1993. In that case the ICJ issued an order several weeks later, on April 8, 1993.

3.Will Myanmar respond to Gambia's ICJ case?

Myanmar announced that State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, in her capacity as foreign affairs minister, will lead its delegation to the ICJ to "defend the national interests of Myanmar." In doing so, she reportedly enjoys the support of her political party, the National League for Democracy, and the Myanmar parliament. The military has said it "will fully cooperate with the government" and follow its instructions. The government explicitly noted that all members of the UN, including Myanmar, are bound by the ICJ Statute.

While public support in Myanmar for Aung San Suu Kyi's decision to represent the country before the ICJ is reportedly high, those who might want to criticize her or the government would do so at considerable risk. Myanmar authorities have frequently arrested and prosecuted people speaking or writing critically of the government, military, and officials.

Still, some representatives of ethnic groups both inside and outside the country have issued statements backing the ICJ proceedings, noting similarities in the Tatmadaw's brutal tactics against the Rohingya and other minority communities.

4.How could the ICJ enforce a provisional measures order?

The ICJ's provisional measures orders are legally binding on the parties. Myanmar's explicit recognition of the ICJ's authority should dispense with any legal question as to whether the government needs to comply with the court's orders and decisions. Gambia has also asked the court to require Myanmar and Gambia to provide the court with a report on steps taken to implement a provisional measures order "no later than four months from its issuance."

Other UN bodies could take steps to increase the power of the ICJ's order and, by extension, increase the political cost should Myanmar fail to comply.

Under article 41(2) of the ICJ Statute, the court's provisional measures orders are automatically sent to the UN Security Council. Such an order would increase pressure on the council to take concrete action in Myanmar, including through a binding resolution to address some of the indicators of genocidal intent outlined in the comprehensive 2018 report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar ("Fact Finding Mission").

For example, the Security Council could pass a resolution directing Myanmar to lift restrictions on Rohingya's freedom of movement, eliminate unnecessary restrictions on humanitarian access to Rakhine State, repeal discriminatory laws, and ban practices that limit Rohingya access to education, health care, and livelihoods. Thus far, the Security Council has been deadlocked on Myanmar, in part because of China's support for Myanmar's leadership and its veto power.

The UN General Assembly can also reinforce the weight of an ICJ order on Myanmar by passing a resolution urging the government to comply with its terms.

5.What has Gambia alleged in its complaint against Myanmar?

Establishing that genocide has taken place under the Genocide Convention requires demonstrating genocidal intent and genocidal acts, meaning the state had the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group in whole or in part.

In 2018, the Fact-Finding Mission presented a comprehensive analysis of the Rohingya's status as a protected group, genocidal acts, and indicators of genocidal intent and concluded that "the actions of those who orchestrated the attacks on the Rohingya read as a veritable check-list" on how to destroy the target group in whole or in part. The Fact-Finding Mission further concluded in 2019 that "the State of Myanmar breached its obligation not to commit genocide under the Genocide Convention."

Gambia's application identifies two elements of Myanmar's persecution of the Rohingya as "particularly indicative of genocidal intent": its systematic denial of legal rights to Rohingya, notably restrictions on their ability to marry and bear children and severe restrictions on freedom of movement, including detention camps, and its support for, and participation in, pervasive hate campaigns aimed at demonizing and dehumanizing the group.

As for the genocidal acts, the application points to incidents from the October 2016 and August 2017 "clearance operations" including mass executions of Rohingya men, women, and children; the systematic burning of Rohingya villages "with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part"; the targeting of children; and the commission of rape and sexual violence on a massive scale.

As for ongoing acts of genocide, the application highlights continuing attacks on the Rohingya, notably the destruction of more than 30 villages between November 2018 and May 2019 and the denial to Rohingya of access to food. It also notes the Fact-Finding Mission's recent warning that the 600,000 Rohingya still in Myanmar live under the threat of further genocidal acts by Myanmar.

6.What relief can the ICJ provide to victims if it rules in favor of Gambia?

Gambia has asked the court to declare that Myanmar has and continues to breach its obligations under the Genocide Convention; must cease ongoing genocidal acts and fully respect its obligations moving forward; must ensure that perpetrators of genocide are held to account before a competent tribunal; and must provide reparations to Rohingya victims of genocidal acts, including "allowing the safe and dignified return" of those who have been forcibly displaced and "respect for their full citizenship and human rights and protection against discrimination, persecution and other related acts." Gambia has also asked that Myanmar offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of violations of the Genocide Convention.

Under article 94 of the UN Charter, all member countries must abide by ICJ decisions in cases to which they are a party, and in the event of non-compliance, the UN Security Council may "decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment."

7.Who are the ICJ's judges?

The ICJ's 15-member bench is composed of judges from different countries representing the world's main legal systems. ICJ judges work independently of any government and before taking up their duties, must solemnly declare in open court that they will "exercise their powers impartially and conscientiously." Each judge is elected to serve a nine-year term.

Under article 31 of the ICJ Statute, a party to a case before the ICJ can appoint an ad hoc judge to act in the case if it does not already have a judge of its nationality on the bench.

Gambia has asked the court to appoint South African jurist Dr. Navanethem (Navi) Pillay as its ad hoc judge. Pillay served as a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court before becoming the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from 2008 to 2014.

Myanmar has asked the court to appoint German academic Professor Claus Kress as its ad hoc judge. Kress is the director of the Institute of International Peace and Security Law at the University of Cologne, Germany.

8.Has the ICJ ruled on other genocide cases?

In 2007, the ICJ ruled that there was a genocide in the Srebrenica enclave in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that Serbia violated its duty to prevent genocide. The court also ruled that Serbia violated its duty to punish genocide by failing to surrender Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic, one of the architects of the Srebrenica genocide, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for prosecution. Serbia finally surrendered Mladic to the Yugoslav tribunal in 2011.

9.Are there efforts to bring individual perpetrators in Myanmar to justice?

In November, the International Criminal Court's judges gave Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda authorization to open an investigation into crimes against humanity, notably the forced deportation in 2017 of more than 740,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh, an ICC member. ICC judges previously confirmed that the court had jurisdiction because the crime of deportation was completed in an ICC member country. The judges also ruled that the prosecutor can investigate other crimes, including future crimes, if they are within the ICC's jurisdiction and are sufficiently linked to the situation described in the prosecutor's request – which focused on crimes committed during two waves of violence, in 2016 and 2017 in Rakhine State – since Bangladesh became an ICC member in June 2010.

Myanmar is not a member of the Rome Statute, the court's founding treaty, so only the UN Security Council can refer all grave crimes in Myanmar to the ICC for investigation. An ICC referral remains critical to address the full scope of criminality in Rakhine State and in Kachin and Shan States, where the military has used many of the same brutal tactics against other ethnic minorities. An ICC referral would also give the court jurisdiction to address alleged criminality by ethnic armed groups in Myanmar.

Also in November, a group of Rohingya and Latin American human rights organizations filed a criminal case in Argentina against Myanmar's top military leaders for crimes committed in Rakhine State. The case was filed using the principle of universal jurisdiction – an avenue for crimes so serious that all states have an interest in addressing them.

Finally, in September 2018, the UN Human Rights Council created the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar to collect evidence of the most serious international crimes and prepare files for criminal prosecution "to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings" in national, regional, or international courts. Myanmar announced at the General Assembly that it "reject[s] the establishment of the new Investigation Mechanism (IIM) set up to bring Myanmar to tribunals to which we object strongly," and that "we do not recognize nor will we cooperate with this mechanism."

10.What are the prospects for justice in Myanmar?

The Myanmar government has repeatedly avoided taking meaningful steps towards justice for crimes committed by its military.

In July 2018, the government established the "International Commission of Enquiry," with the participation of two international members, including the chair who has said that "there will be no blaming, [...] no finger-pointing of anybody." This commission has yet to deliver any results, and likely will not, given its own lack of credibility and the resounding failure of previous government commissions. Myanmar authorities have also taken steps to erase evidence of crimes, notably bulldozing over numerous Rohingya villages to make way for military installments.

In November 2018, Myanmar's commander-in-chief, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, pardoned seven Tatmadaw soldiers who served just seven months of their 10-year prison sentences for their role in a massacre of Rohingya in Inn Din village. They served less prison time than Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, the two Reuters journalists who uncovered the killings and who were convicted by a Yangon court of obtaining state secrets in a proceeding that highlighted the lack of independence of Myanmar's judiciary. Both journalists spent a total of 17 months in prison before their May 2019 amnesty and release. The government's handling of the Inn Din case casts serious doubt on the ability of the military's court of inquiry created in March 2019 to address allegations of human rights violations in northern Rakhine State committed by its own soldiers.

In November 2019, the government announced it had formed yet another mechanism, this time a "Special Unit on International Criminal Justice in order to strengthen internal capacity and expertise, and provide legal opinion to relevant Ministries on issues related to international criminal law," under the State Counsellor's office, including two military officers. But the UN-documented structural obstacles to criminal accountability in Myanmar – including the lack of independence of Myanmar's judges, as well as the current constitutional and legal framework that prevents the civilian authorities from holding the military or its members accountable for human rights violations  significantly dim the prospects for any credible justice mechanism in Myanmar.